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Abstract: The paper focuses on eﬃciency under monopoly. Contrary to common
wisdom, nine examples given in the paper show that a Pareto-eﬃcient output in monopoly
is possible under both linear and nonlinear pricing. Pareto eﬃciency can be achieved
when consumers are homogeneous as well as heterogeneous. Since Pareo-eﬃciency is
possible under diﬀerent demand and cost conditions; diﬀerent pricing strategies; and
diﬀerent degree of consumer heterogeneity, in general, monopoly per se is not the cause
for ineﬁciency.
JEL Codes: D42, L10, L40Informational Structure and Eﬃciency in Monopoly
1. Introduction
Common economic wisdom is that monopoly pricing results in an ineﬃcient allocation
of resources because of some deadweight loss. However, in the literature there exist some
counter examples contradicting this general view. By presenting diﬀerent examples, this
paper attempts to review plausible conditions that can lead to Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes.
In addition, we compare diﬀerent situations when Pareto eﬃciency is not attainable. This
comparison may be useful for eﬃciency-motivated public policy.
Besides theoretical interest in studying eﬃciency, several comments from Bill Gates
(1999) related to acquisition of information using the Internet have also motivated us.
“...Some Web merchants will adopt ﬂexible pricing. Flexible prices are already a ﬁxture
of the ordinary marketplace. ... Direct-mail marketers often publish diﬀerent prices in
diﬀerent catalogs targeted at diﬀerent market segments. ...merchants are setting prices
according to an individual’s willingness to pay. ...Sellers will identify repeat visitors to
their online stores and give them personalized information and services. If a store’s Web
site comes to know what kinds of prices a customer has or hasn’t been willing to pay
in the past, it may reduce a price to spur that customer to buy. Many Web sites ask
users for registration information, including name, address, demographic data and credit
information. While this data enables businesses to oﬀer better services and support for
customers and do more targeted marketing, consumers should be able to approve in
advance the use of any personal data and whether that data can be passed on to other
entities” (p. 76-77). These emerging capabilities beg an important question: Will the
2society be better oﬀ when a monopolist motivated by acquisition of some information
or forced by legal statutes switches from one type of pricing to another? Although an
unequivocal answer to such a broad question is hardly possible, our modest goal is to shed
some light on the implication of such practices based on the economic theory of pricing
and simple intuitions.
We approach this question by classifying diﬀerent market situations (to some extent
following Armstrong and Vickers (2001)) that are relevant for pricing strategies typically
chosen by a single-product monopolist. The ﬁrst factor to consider is the structure of
demand or the degree of its heterogeneity. Indeed, the aggregate demand can be com-
prised of many similar consumers (homogeneous demand), or in a limiting case, the same
aggregate demand is obtained from heterogeneous consumers, i.e., each consumer has
ad i ﬀerent demand curve. More typical are the intermediate cases representing several
‘more-or-less-homogeneous’ groups. For these cases, two kinds of information about the
consumer groups are important: (1) Does the monopolist know the demand structures of
the homogeneous groups? (2) Is the market ‘segmentable’?
An aﬃrmative answer to the ﬁrst question enables, at least, the use of non-linear
pricing schemes (second-degree price discrimination), in particular, ‘package-pricing.’1
An aﬃrmative answer to the second question enables the monopolist to practice third-
degree price discrimination based on market segmentation, or in the extreme case, perfect
discrimination.2 Of course, the possibility of an aﬃrmative answer in itself does not
1Package pricing is a form of nonlinear pricing. It can be used when a monopolist can only observe
purchases by diﬀerent groups of homogeneous consumers. It does not require identiﬁcation of consumers
and hence consumer types may be hidden. Because consumers are hidden, the monopolist oﬀers diﬀerent
quantity-tariﬀ bundles (packages) on ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis and consumers self-select.
2The necessary prerequisite for the practice of third-degree price discrimination is that the aggregate
3guarantee that these pricing schemes will really be practiced. The strategy that will
actually be implemented depends on the relative proﬁtability of each scheme and also on
the possibility of arbitrage. The likely choices of pricing strategies depending on diﬀerent
informational situations are stated in Table 1.3
TABLE 1- INFORMATION AND PRICING STRATEGIES UNDER NO ARBITRAGE
Information about consumer groups
Identiﬁcation of No information Incomplete information Full information
consumer types ( heterogeneous groups) (homogeneous groups)
Non-observable 1. Linear pricing ? 2. Package pricing
Observable − 3. Pricing using segmentation 4. Personal pricing
(e.g., 3rd-degree discrimination) (perfect discrimination)
The classiﬁcation in Table 1 has an intuitive appeal about relative proﬁtability. Gen-
erally, price discrimination of any degree, when it can be practiced without any arbitrage
or other impediments, is more proﬁtable than uniform pricing. More precisely, price dis-
crimination gives at least no less proﬁt than uniform price because the uniform price is
one of the choices available when choosing the most proﬁtable discrimination. Thus,
(1) Generally, simple uniform pricing should be practiced when, except for the total
market demand, no other information about heterogeneous consumers is known, or be-
cause of arbitrage any other pricing scheme is not implementable. (2) Nonlinear pricing,
demand must be segmentable into submarkets based on some identiﬁable characterstics of consumers.
Because the pricing used in third-degree price discrimination is linear, consmer homogeneity, although
preferable, is not necessary as is the case with package pricing.
3Table 1 does not give a complete taxonomy of optimal choices of pricing strategies for a broad
spectrum of market situations. It would be too complicated to incorporate diﬀerent arbitrage possibilities
and diﬀerent degrees of heterogeneity and observarbility of consumers. The picture would become even
more complex if additional factors such as transaction costs, legal constraints, etc., which we ignore here,
are taken into account. For simplicity, we consider pricing schemes without any arbitrage.
4and in particular, package pricing, can be used when a monopolist knows the demands
of diﬀerent groups of consumers, each group consisting of homogeneous consumers, but
cannot observe ac o n s u m e r ’ sa ﬃliation to a particular group (non-segmentable market).4
In addition, inter-group arbitrage is impossible (3) Third-degree price discrimination can
be used when in addition to no arbitrage, observarbility enables sorting of many hetero-
geneous consumers into segments or sub-markets.5 Is linear pricing the only option under
third-degree price discrimination? It is often assumed to be the case in the literature, and
we adhere to the tradition. (4) Perfect price discrimination is the limiting case of perfect
knowledge and observarbility without arbitrage. In particular, when all consumers are
observable, then each consumer can be treated as a separate homogeneous market, and
we arrive at cell 4 (see example 7 below). In this situation, several pricing strategies can
be used to capture the consumer surplus, and personal pricing includes all such pricing
strategies.
Our focus is on social (Pareto) eﬃciency under the optimal solutions for the four
choices of pricing strategies mentioned above. Giving a complete picture of eﬃciency for all
combinations of assumptions and the resulting solutions is hardly possible. Generally, the
eﬀects are ambiguous. The important exception is the well-known Robinson-Schmalensee
result.6 In Section 2, we give examples that show the possibility of Pareto-eﬃcient out-
4For a non-segmentable market, although price discrimination based on direct segmentation is not
possible, a nonlinear pricing based on self-selection by consumers is implementable. In cell 2, we mention
only package pricing because among diﬀerent nonlinear pricing schemes, package pricing can be shown to
be most proﬁtable. Other pricing schemes may be applicable in the cell marked by ?, but exact conditions
remain unclear.
5Speciﬁcally, by ‘observable’ or ‘segmentable’ market structure, we mean that the monopolist not only
can distinguish consumers based on some identiﬁable characteristics (e.g., age, location, gender etc.), but
is also able to use these characterstics legally in the design and implementation of pricing strategies of
her choice.
6For some deﬁnite conclusions about eﬃciency in some cases, see Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985)
5comes under all types of pricing strategies. When the ﬁrst-best solution is not possible,
then social eﬃciency often increases downwards in our classiﬁcation 1— 4.7 Ac o m p l e t e
analysis of speciﬁc situations showing some exceptions to this general tendency is pre-
sented in Section 3. We compare eﬃciency between uniform pricing, package pricing, and
third-degree price discrimination for two linear demands. The results have some public
policy implications. Section 4 concludes with some suggestions for possible extensions of
the topic. The appendix includes formal derivations and proofs.
2. Pareto-eﬃciency examples
Our primary goal in this Section is to present a suﬃciently broad collection of examples
of eﬃcient outcomes under monopoly. These examples shed some light on the controversy
between proﬁtable monopoly pricing schemes and social eﬃciency under some combi-
nations of three main market characteristics, i.e., heterogeneity, knowledge of consumer
groups and observarbility. Though some of our examples may seem too speciﬁc, they are
contrary to the common wisdom of ‘always-ineﬃcient-monopoly.’
A. Uniform linear pricing under arbitrage or unknown groups
For this case, we can mention at least three counter-examples to the generally good
assertion of ‘ineﬃcient monopoly.’ For diﬀerentiable functions, the proﬁt-maximizing
monopoly output can coincide with the Pareto-eﬃcient, if and only if, x˙ p(x)=0 ,w h e r e
x denotes quantity, p(x) is the inverse demand function, c(x) is the cost function, and dot
denotes the derivative.
and Schwartz (1990).
7See also Armstrong and Vickers (2001) for welfare eﬀects of price discrimination in oligopoly using
‘competition-in-utility-space’ approach.
6Example 1: O n es u c hs o l u t i o nw i t hzero derivative can be constructed using the func-
tions p(x)=1+( 1− x)3 and c(x)=1
2x2, which are shown in Fig. 1(a).
Examples 2 and 3: These two examples give another solution of eﬃcient uniform
monopoly pricing for non-diﬀerential functions. Figure 1(b) relates to a locally perfectly
elastic demand.8 Figure 1(c) shows another example demonstrating a similar idea but for
a locally perfectly inelastic supply. Note that all three examples are based on speciﬁcl o c a l
behavior of demand and supply curves, and the standard proof of ineﬃciency discourages
further attempts to construct more such examples. It is interesting to note here that in
these examples, welfare is divided between the consumers and the producer so that the
consumer surplus is non-zero.
B. All types of consumers observable (perfectly segmentable market)
Next, we consider several examples of perfect discrimination when all consumer types
are observable (case 4).
Example 4: Consider ﬁrst a very particular case of bilateral monopoly (a single buyer
and a single seller). In reality this may be the case when a single producer of tanks,
ﬁghter planes, etc., sells these goods to a single buyer, namely the government. In this
case, there is room for bargaining between the seller and the buyer over the division of
welfare. However, in any case, it is reasonable to suppose that the two will arrive at a
Pareto-eﬃcient agreement so that the quantity remains optimal.
Example 5: Very similar to the single-consumer case is the situation with several
8To understand the ﬁgures note that the goal of monopolist is to maximize proﬁtw h i c hi st h ea r e a
between the dashed line and the marginal cost curve. In choosing optimal quantity ˆ x the monopolist
must compare any possible increase in price with decrease in quantity. For this trade oﬀ, the slope of the
demand curve above the solution point matters for the example to be valid. Thus, among locally elastic
demands only the special ones relate to an eﬃcient monopoly.
7cooperating consumers. For instance, suppose the residents of a village are willing to buy
a bridge from a monopolistic builder. When the residents are wise enough to cooperate
eﬃciently (say, by Groves-Clark procedure) then the resulting coalition is, in essence,
e q u i v a l e n tt oas i n g l ec o n s u m e r ,a n dw ea r r i v ea tt h es a m ee ﬃcient outcome as above.
Example 6: Something similar may also happen in the case of many homogeneous
consumers. For this situation, the monopolist again is in a very good informational
position to practice perfect price discrimination. It may diﬀer from the above cases
because it is the monopolist who now has the bargaining power. To extract the entire
welfare, the obvious choice for the monopolist is to oﬀer a single package containing the
Pareto-eﬃcient quantity. It is interesting to note that in this case, packages are possible
despite the possibility of arbitrage! But because all consumers are the same, no one can
be better oﬀ by reselling her package.
Can other pricing schemes be used for perfect price discrimination? The answer de-
pends upon the possibility of arbitrage. When arbitrage is possible, a two-part tariﬀ
should result in reselling and some loss of proﬁt. However, when arbitrage is prevented,
using the same logic as above, a two-part tariﬀ or other tariﬀ functions like A+f(x)c a n
also give the same result - - maximum proﬁt and Pareto eﬃciency.
Example 7: Example 6 can also be generalized to a situation where there are many
types of consumers, but the market is completely segmentable. Each group consists of ho-
mogeneous consumers, and a consumer belonging to a particular group is also observable.
Then the previous idea can be implemented for each market segment to practice perfect
price discrimination.
8C. Non-segmentable market, no arbitrage and known demand structures
We now turn to a more puzzling situation when the monopolist knows the demands
of two homogeneous groups (e.g., a high-demand group and a low-demand group) and
arbitrage is prevented, but the market is non-segmentable (case 2). For this case, nonlinear
pricing can be used. When consumer groups are homogeneous, it is most practical to use
package pricing based on a step-wise outlay function. It is again the common wisdom that
Pareto eﬃciency is unattainable. However, this common wisdom is true only for the most
explored case of several diﬀerent consumer groups with “ordered” demands (“ordered”
means that the demand curves of diﬀerent consumer types do not cross). For this case, the
textbook proofs show that the monopolist oﬀers too small a package (a quantity less than
Pareto eﬃcient) for the low-demand consumers to prevent high-demand consumers from
t a k i n gas m a l l e rp a c k a g e . 9 Example 8 below shows that not only can Pareto-eﬃciency
occur, but such an outcome is non-degenerate for the “non-ordered” demands (“non-
ordered” means that the demand curves of diﬀerent consumer types do cross).10
Example 8:T os e ew h yP a r e t oe ﬃciency is a non-degenerate outcome, consider Figure
2 with two linear demands denoted by ˙ vi(xi), and derived from valuations functions vi(xi).
Costs are assumed to be zero. One can check that the monopolist will oﬀer two diﬀerent
incentive-compatible packages (ˆ x1,t 1), (ˆ x2,t 2) as shown. The peak of each valuation func-
tion is represented by the most preferred quantity ˆ xi (i =1 ,2). Incentive-compatibility
constraints are satisﬁed when the ﬁrst peak at the Pareto-eﬃcient quantity for consumer
9Recall that consumers self-select and incentive-compatibility constraints must be satisﬁed, i.e., no
consumer should have an incentive to switch to the package designed for the someone else.
10For a complete analysis of package pricing under both orderd and non-ordered demands, see Nahata,
Kokovin and Zelobodko (2002).
9type 1 is above the second curve and the second peak at the Pareto-eﬃcient quantity for
the consumer type 2 is above the ﬁrst curve. Nothing else is required. These arguments
show that Pareto-eﬃcient package pricing is feasible not only when two demand triangles
are equal, but when they are ‘more-or-less-similar.’ This similarity of demand triangles
for linear demands amounts to the condition β/(2β − 1) ≥ α ≥ 2 − β,w h e r eα is the
height of one demand triangle, β is its length and the other triangle is the standard (1,1)
simplex.11
It should be noted that Pareto-eﬃciency under package pricing is not only a non-
degenerate outcome, but it is rather probable.12 Further, the ﬁgure also demonstrates
that, in general, Pareto-eﬃcient package pricing is probable not only f o rl i n e a rd e m a n d s ,
zero costs, and uniform distribution of parameters, but also for nonlinear demands and
positive costs.
Example 9:P a r e t oe ﬃciency can also be realized under the limiting case when distinc-
tion between ordered and non-ordered demands disappears. This happens when β =1
and α is suﬃciently high. It is easy to see that for this special situation a single Pareto-
eﬃcient package of size 1 for both types of consumers can be oﬀered with a uniform tariﬀ
α/2. U n l i k et h ec a s eo ft w oc o n s u m e r sc a s ea b o v e ,P a r e t oe ﬃciency is realized with a
non-zero consumer surplus, which equals (1 − α)/2 for the high-demand consumers. Of
course, the question of any arbitrage does not arise in this case.
Some important inferences from Examples 8 and 9 are noteworthy. First, Pareto-
11For the derivation of this condition see the appendix.
12To evaluate the probability of such eﬃcient outcomes, assume a uniform distribution of α ∈ (0,1)
and another independent uniform distribution of β ∈ (1,b), for some b>1, describing the maximum
possible length of the long triangle. For b>2, this probability is more than 0.137, and it increases as
b →∞to 1/2.
10eﬃciency can be realized without full information about the unobservable homogeneous
consumers. Second, unlike linear pricing, for packages Pareto-eﬃciency can be realized
with zero consumer surplus (no informational rent) for all types of consumers. Third, due
to increasing information as we move downwards in our classiﬁcation 1-4, social eﬃciency
becomes a non-degenerate case.
3. Comparison of eﬃciency between linear and nonlinear pricing
In Section 2, our focus was on Pareto-eﬃcient allocations under monopoly. However,
more typical is the case when most pricing schemes do not result in the ﬁrst-best or
the Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes. For these situations, there is one important question both
theoretically and in the context of public policy: Which pricing strategy is socially more
eﬃcient?
We present some new results for linear demands by comparing package pricing with
both uniform pricing and third-degree price discrimination (comparing cells 1, 2 and 3 in
Table 1 with each other). The comparison between uniform pricing (case 1) and second
or third-degree price discrimination is easily interpretable. Should legislations and/or
innovations enhancing the ability of the monopolist to discriminate be encouraged?
It is not so easy to interpret the comparison between case 2 and case 3 because sec-
ond and third-degree price discriminations are practiced under diﬀerent circumstances.
Third-degree price discrimination can be practiced when the aggregate demand can be
segmented into sub-markets based on some identiﬁable characteristics of consumers. Such
segmentation, in general, may not represent homogeneous groups because willingness to
pay may not be the same for all consumers in a segmented sub-market based identiﬁable
11characteristics. This may be the reason why the pricing employed is linear in third-degree
price discrimination. On the other hand, for package pricing only group homogeneity is
required and consumers need not be observable based on identiﬁable characteristics. Be-
cause of the diﬀerences in conditions under which the two pricing strategies are practiced,
the question of choosing one over the other should not arise. For example, suppose that the
monopolist cannot identify the two hidden types of consumers and initially uses package
pricing. Now, because of some new informational innovation (e.g., Internet), suppose the
monopolist can identify consumers in each of the two groups based on some observable
attributes. As a result, the monopolist should now switch from second-degree to per-
fect discrimination, which has the highest proﬁtability, rather than to the less proﬁtable,
third-degree price discrimination. Similarly, suppose consumers are observable but be-
cause their homogeneity is not known, third-degree price discrimination is practiced. Now
suppose in addition to identifying consumers their homogeneity is also known then again
switching from third-degree to perfect discrimination is more proﬁtable than switching to
second-degree price discrimination because switching to the latter would mean wasting
useful market information. However, the comparison does become meaningful when per-
fect discrimination faces some legal hurdles, public outcry, or as noted by Willig (1978),
when an overt collection of detailed accurate information about each economic agent can
distort the agent’s economic behavior. The comparison also becomes relevant in ﬁguring
out the relative importance of group homogeneity and the observarbility of consumers in
assessing eﬃciency loss/gain.
Our comparisons below are based on two homogeneous groups of consumers of equal
12number with ordered linear demands.13 The aggregate linear demand functions are:
D1(p)=1 − p and D2(p)=β −
β
αp, where α < 1a n dβ < 1. For simplicity, the
costs are assumed to be zero: c(x) ≡ 0. It should be noted, however, that our setting is
rather general for linear demands and linear costs because all situations can be converted
to similar demand functions as above by subtracting costs from the inverse demand func-
tions and normalizing. The advantage is that the normalized demand functions enable
us to describe all possible market situations in terms of only two parameters, α and β,
and also allows us to construct an ‘eﬃciency-map’ that shows relative frequency of various
outcomes.
The results are stated below (proofs are in the Appendix) and the eﬃciency-map
is depicted in Figure 3. All regions are marked with the letters U (uniform pricing), P
(package pricing), and T (third-degree price discrimination). The order of the letters
represent the eﬃciency from the highest to the lowest. For example, U>P>Tm e a n s
uniform pricing is more eﬃcient than package pricing, which in turn is more eﬃcient
than third-degree price discrimination. Although the map does not depict the relative
proﬁtability of diﬀerent pricing schemes, it is true that in all regions, package pricing is
more proﬁtable than third-degree discrimination which is more proﬁtable than uniform
pricing.
13For third-degree we assume that the monopolist knows demands and can observe the consumers in
each market segments but is unable to use perfect discrimination, perhaps being unsure of the homo-
geneity of consumers. More challenging would be the situation when the monopolist observes only some
characterstics of the consumers in two demand groups. For example, the observable groups are younger
and older consumers, while the demand groups consist of high and low-demand consumers, the latter
being 70 percent of young consumers. Then the demand curves of observable groups do not coincide
with those of demand groups and should be re-estimated. Besides, it is not so obvious why instead of
third-degree, the monopolist should not use more proﬁtable package pricing.
13Result 1. (a) Both consumer types are served under uniform pricing, if and only if,
α > 1/(2+β); (b) Both types are served under package pricing, if and only if, α > 0.5.14
In Figure 3, 1/(2 + β) represents curve (1), and 0.5=α is the dashed line.
Result 2. When both types of consumers are served under both uniform and package
pricing then the necessary and suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency to be strictly higher under








In Figure 3, this condition represents the region between 0.5=α and curve (2).
Result 3. When both types of consumers are served under uniform pricing but only
the high-demand consumers are served under package pricing, then the necessary and
suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency to be strictly higher under uniform pricing is max{1/(2+
β),
1+2β−3β2
4β } < α < 0.5.
The region represented by the above inequality is the region between α =0 .5 and curves
(3) and (1).
It is known that for linear demands when all consumers are served, third-degree dis-
crimination is also less eﬃcient than uniform pricing (Robinson-Schmalensee result, which
holds above curve (1) in Fig. 3).15 In contrast, Results 2 and 3 show that package pricing
is, in most cases,m o r ee ﬃcient than uniform pricing, regardless of how many consumer
types are served (see Fig. 3 to estimate the relative probability of eﬃcient outcomes).
Further, Result 3 shows that even when the low-demand consumers are ignored under
14T h eb o r d e r so ft h er e g i o n s0 .5 < α and α > 1/(2+β) are included in the regions where the low-demand
consumers are ignored. Although both markets are always served under third-degree price discrimination,
this need not be the case with package pricing. By ignoring low-demand consumers, the proﬁts can be
higher under package pricing.
15The opposite (U<T) is the case when uniform pricing excludes one market in the region below the
curve (1). One can visually compare the likelihood of each outcome.
14package pricing, eﬃciency, in most cases, is higher under package pricing. The reason is
that the high-demand consumers buy the package containing the Pareto-eﬃcient quantity,
and the deadweight loss is only from the low-demand triangle. It is mostly smaller than
the deadweight loss under uniform-pricing, which amounts approximately 1/4 of the area
of the demand rectangle formed by two overlapping triangles.
Result 4. When both types of consumers are served under package pricing, both the
eﬃciency and proﬁts are always higher in package pricing than under third-degree price
discrimination.
Result 5. Proﬁts are higher under package pricing than third-degree price discrimina-
tion even when only the high-demand consumers are served under package pricing. The
necessary and suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency to be strictly higher under third-degree
price discrimination is
1
2 ≥ α >
1
3β.
In Figure 3, this region is between α =0 .5 and to the right of curve 4 (the mouth of
‘frog’ shaded in the plot).
There is a simple economic intuition behind the eﬃciency conclusion in Result 4.
Package pricing results in the Pareto-eﬃcient quantity for the high-demand consumers.
Although there is a deadweight loss from the low-demand consumers in both third-degree
discrimination and package pricing, the elimination of deadweight loss from the high-
demand consumers in package pricing is always large enough to result in a net increase
in eﬃciency.
The ‘eﬃciency-map’ in Figure 3 clearly shows that package pricing results in highest
eﬃciency except in the region bounded by curves 2, 3 and 1. This is the only region in
15which uniform pricing results in higher eﬃciency. The area of this region (U>P) is approx-
imately 0.0586, or about 6 percent of the unit square describing all parameters of ordered
demands. Similarly, only in the sub-region (U>T>P ) ,w i t ha na r e ao fa p p r o x i m a t e l y
0.0315, is third-degree price discrimination more eﬃcient than package pricing.
There are some policy implications from our results. First, from an eﬃciency consider-
ation alone, third-degree price discrimination is least desirable under linear demands when
it does not open up new markets. Second, suppose a monopolist has the relevant infor-
mation about diﬀerent consumers to practice third-degree price discrimination. Certainly
there is a strong proﬁt incentive to switch to perfect discrimination. But when perfect
discrimination is not feasible for the reasons mentioned earlier, the more proﬁtable, and
in most situations more eﬃcient, second-degree price discrimination becomes an obvious
choice. Although third-degree price discrimination can be justiﬁed based on eﬃciency
considerations (the Robinson-Patman Act), such considerations becomes redundant here
because the more proﬁtable second-degree price discrimination should and can be used
instead.
4. Conclusions and extensions
The nine examples above show that, at least theoretically, neither monopoly nor the
degree of monopoly power is necessarily the cause of Pareto ineﬃciency. Although our
Examples 1-3 are pathological, from purely theoretical stand point even the choice of
pricing strategy (linear versus nonlinear) is not the sole determinant of ineﬃciency. The
most general conclusion that can be drawn from these examples is that, although not all,
in most cases, the informational structure of the market (e.g., observarbility and homo-
16geneity) is a signiﬁcant determinant of Pareto eﬃciency. For unobservable heterogeneous
situations, generally there are some eﬃciency losses, except for some very special demand
curves shown in Figure 1. Between identiﬁable but heterogeneous groups (third-degree)
and unidentiﬁable but homogeneous groups (package pricing), eﬃciency is always higher
under the latter case when both types of consumers are served. Even when only one type
is served under package pricing eﬃciency is mostly higher except in the situation depicted
in Figure 3 (see Result 5). Thus, if consumer homogeneity is known through suﬃcient
information about consumers, a monopolist can implement a suitable nonlinear pricing
strategy that can result in higher eﬃciency or even Pareto-eﬃcient outcome (examples
8-9). Of course, in cases when both homogeneity and observarbility are feasible at the
same time, a Pareto-eﬃcient outcome can result and it is not a pathological case.
If eﬃciency is the main consideration then the relevant public policy question is:
Should the regulators of monopolies actively engage in legislating monopolistic pricing
practices or encourage innovations or practices that enhance abilities to acquire more
information about the consumers? For a monopolist proﬁt incentive is a strong motivating
factor to acquire relevant information about consumers. Therefore, attempts to acquire
information using, for example, the Internet can potentially minimize or in some cases even
eliminate the distortions traditionally associated with monopoly. If income redistribution
is not taken into account, a policy encouraging an improved informational structure of
market due to informational innovations is likely to promote eﬃciency.
We suggest two extensions of the topic. First, a comprehensive analysis of the most
proﬁtable pricing schemes for all informational situations of the market, especially for the
17second column in our Table 1, will enhance the understanding of the relationship between
information and eﬃciency. Another useful extension would be to incorporate transaction
costs and the cost of information in analyzing the choice of diﬀerent pricing schemes and
eﬃciency.
Appendix
Condition for Pareto eﬃciency for non-ordered demands (Example 8)
Recall that there are two types of consumers with normalized inverse demand functions
p(x1)=1− x1 and p(x2)=α − αx2/β. For the non-ordered case α < 1a n dβ > 1a n d
hence the two demands cross with each other. For perfect discrimination the monopolist
would choose quantity-tariﬀ bundle (xi,t i)s ot h a tˆ x1 =1 , ˆ x2 = β, ˆ t1 =1 /2, ˆ t2 = αβ/2
(this can be obtained by diﬀerentiating the area of each demand triangles and setting
it equal to zero). Both participation constraints v1(x1) − t1 = x1 − x2
1/2 − 1/2 ≥ 0
and v2(x2) − t2 = αx2 − αx2
2/2β − αβ/2 ≥ 0 are satisﬁed. The same (xi,t i)c o n s t i t u t e s
the solution for the ﬁrst-best package pricing when the self-selection constraints, namely
v1(x1) − t1 ≥ v1(x2) − t2, and v2(x2) − t2 ≥ v2(x1) − t1, will be satisﬁed. By comparing
these relations with (ˆ xi,ˆ ti) we get the region of parameters β/(2β − 1) ≥ α ≥ 2 − β for
the Pareto-eﬃcient packages.
Formulae for diﬀerent pricing schemes for ordered demands
Uniform Pricing
Under simple monopoly the aggregate demand is







Case 1: When both markets are served then x1 > 0a n dx2 > 0. For the linear
18demand, the expressions for the optimal price, optimal quantity and proﬁt are standard.
The optimal price is p∗
U2 =
α(1+β)







2(α+β) and x∗ =
β+1








8(α+β)2 ,C S 2 =
αβ(−1+β+2α)
2
8(α+β)2 and CSU2 =
αβ2−6αβ+4α2β+4β+α
8(α+β) .











1 =0 , a n dπ∗
U1 = 1
4,C S 1 = 1



















8 ; CST =
1+αβ
8 ; πT =
1+αβ





For ordered-demands (β ≤ 1) the expressions for package pricing can be easily obtained
(see Varian (1992)).
Case 1: When both consumer types are served then the optimal quantity and tariﬀ
(xi,t i) for the high-demand and the low-demand consumers are
(x1,t 1)=( 1 ,
α(4βα2−8αβ+4α−β+2β2)











0a n dCSP2 =
β(−3α+β−4α3+8α2−2αβ)
2(2α−β)2 . The resulting welfare WP2 =
4βα3+4α2−5αβ+2αβ2−4α2β2+β2
2(2α−β)2 .
19Case 2: Under the package pricing when it is optimal to serve only one consumer type
(ignoring solution) then obviously x1 =1 ,t 1 = 1
2,x 2 =0 ,t 2 =0 ,p r o ﬁt πP1 = 1
2. The




The border of the regions when one or two markets will be served under uniform price
c a nb ed e t e r m i n e di nt e r m so fp a r a m e t e r sα and β. When these two strategies compete
(price p∗
U1 is above the kink in the demand curve, and price p∗







U1. This inequality holds, if and only if, α >
1
2+β. The combinations
of (α,β) when both prices (calculated from diﬀerent triangles) p∗
U2, p∗
U1 are on the same
side of the kink is given by α = 1
2+β, which constitutes the border.
The border under package pricing can be obtained by using the standard textbook
arguments. Note that when there are two types of consumers in equal numbers, then at
the optimal solution resulting two packages the willingness-to-pay for the marginal unit
of good of the low-demand consumer should be one-half of the high-demand consumer’s
willingness-to-pay for this unit, or P2(x2)=0 .5P1(x2). This condition is satisﬁed, if and
only if, α =0 .5, and both types of consumers will be served when α > 0.5.
Proofs: Results 2-5
By comparing the applicable welfare formulas for each case, the results follow.
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Figure 3: Comparison of efficiency under different pricing